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indefinite as to constitute a violation of the Sixth Amendment. Those
attacking this section of the Lever Act laid great stress on the case
of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky.8 But that was a case
under a state -statute making "any combination lawful unless for the
purpose or with the effect of fixing a price that was greater or less
than the real value of the article." And this "real value" was to be
its market value "under fair competition and under normal market
conditions." The court held that this was compelling the corporation
to guess what prices would be in an imaginary world and under penalty
of an indictment, and held the law void. The opinion in the Harvester
Co. case distinguishes the Nash case by saying, "that deals with the
actual, not with an imaginary condition other than the facts." "The
statute may be construed to forbid, in time of war, any departure from
the usual and established scale of charges and prices in time of peace,
which is not justified -by some special circumstance of the commodity
or dealer."9 Thus interpreted, it would seem that the Lever Act cannot
be successfully attacked on the ground of indefiniteness.
Section 4 of the Lever Act has, however, been held unconstitutional
as a violation of the Fifth Amendment, because it exempts from its
operation farmers and others. In the case of United States v. Arm-
strong"0 Judge Anderson of Indiana held that the "due process of
law" clatise was violated because of the arbitrary and unreasonable
classification in exempting farmers and stockmen. These persons
were favored in comparison with the producers of fuel, for example,
whose product was of similar nature and quite as necessary to the
conduct of the war. This presents an interesting problem on which
we may shortly expect to see further litigation.11
SOCIAL WELFARE
A field in which reliable social welfare statistics as to the effect of
legal principles in actual operation would be of inestimable value in
deciding what the law ought to be, is -that of attorney's contingent fee
contracts. The argument from necessity for such contracts is obvious:
that otherwise poor suitors with deserving cases would find it impos-
sible to get their cases into court. Hence the validity of such contracts
8 (r914) 234 U. S. 216, 34 Sup. Ct. 853.
United States v. Oglesby Grocery Co., supra, note 6, at p. 695.
10 (I92o, D. Ind.) 265 Fed. 683.
'The payment of a fine imposed in a criminal case, even if the judgment of
conviction was void, is not a bar to a suit to recover the money. United States v.
Rothenstein (ig", C. C. A. 7th) 187 Fed. 268. Under this rule a fine which had
been paid to the government following a conviction under the original section was
recovered in Mossew v. United States, supra, note 2.
COMMENTS
is usually upheld in this country., Just as obvious is the fact that
there is now afforded unworthy members of the profession an oppor-
tunity availed of all too often for making extortionate and uncon-
scionable agreements and for speculating in weak cases, accompanied,
as such practice usually must be, by the worst forms of solicitation
and touting of business.2  Statistics, if available, as to the number of
meritorious cases saved by contingent fee contracts, the number of
cases decided for defendants instituted under such agreements and
the like would throw much light upon the desirability of the present
legal viewpoint.3 The proper result may well be that it is more desir-
able to provide for the needs of poor litigants in other ways, such as
the legal aid society and similar agencies.' At any rate courts may
well refuse to uphold such contracts when the necessity for them does
not exist or is outweighed by other considerations. Thus the law's
well-known abhorrence of divorce leads to a refusal to enforce con-
tingent fee contracts to procure divorces.5 In Baca v. Padilla (1920,
N. M.) 19o Pac. 73o , -the same principle was applied to an attorney's
contract to assist in the prosecution of a criminal case for a fee
contingent upon the conviction of the accused. There has been con-
siderable question as to the wisdom of allowing private counsel to
assist in public prosecution at all; whether the interest of state and
accused are not better served by having the prosecution entirely in
the hands of a disinterested public official. Most courts have thought
such assistance permissible, however, so long as the actual control of
the prosecution remains with the public prosecutor.8 But a contingent
fee contract under such circumstances must rest upon not one but
two principles of doubtful societal value and the court properly
refused to enforce it. 7
'Cases are collected in 2 Thorhton, Attorneys (914) sec. 421; I Ann. Cas.
299, note. As to the limitations on such agreements in some jurisdictions see
Hadlock v. Brooks (i9oi) 178 Mass. 425, 59 N. E. ioo9, and Thornton, op. cit.,
sec. 388.
=See discussion by J. H. Cohen, The Law, Business or Profession (1915)
205 if., especially 209: "Its general practice is to-day at the root of much of all
the evils in the practice of the law, and sooner or later will be controlled either
by rules of court or by legislation."
" See C. E. Grinnell, NoTEs (1882) 16 Am. L. REv. 240, 242; "the actual effect
of an habitual practice for contingent fees . . . seems to us to be the turning
point of the discussion, so far as its value to the profession is concerned."
' See R. H. Smith, Justice and the Poor (igig) for review of agencies devised
to secure better justice for poor litigants.
'Newman v. Freitas (igoo) 129 Cal. 283, 6z Pac. 9o7; Barngrover v. Petti-
grew (igos) 128 Iowa 533, 304 N. W. 904, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 260, note; 33
L. R. A. (N. S.) io74, note.
IState v. Kent (1895) 4 N. D. 597, 62 N. W. 531. But see Rock v. Ekern
(i916) 162 Wis. 29i, 156 N. W. 197. Cases are collected in Ann. Cas. 1912 Bo
659, note.
' There is little authority. See Rock v. Ekern, supra, with L. R. A. 1916 D,
459, note; Price v. Caperton (1864, Ky.) I Duv. 2o7.
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Lobbying contracts are not always illegal; but contracts for the use
of "personal influence" with legislators or executive officers are illegal
and void.1 This is the more certain if payment for such service is
contingent either wholly or in the amount payable, upon success in
the undertaking. In Eads v. Stifel (1920, Mo. App.) 222 S. W. 482,
the appellate court of Missouri held that the same principle applies
in the case of contracts for personal service in political campaigns,
primary and final. The plaintiff's testimony showed that he was prom-
ised $Ioo per week "to use his influence to secure delegates to a
national convention favorable to the candidate supported by the
defendant." The court held this contract to be illegal, both by virtue
of a particular statute defining the crime of bribery, and on grounds
of general public policy.
One has a glowing mental picture of that "innocent female" of
the old melodrama, that sweet heroine of incredible gullibility relent-
lessly pursued 'by a tort-feasing villain of criminal intent. But the
Supreme Court of Iowa" produces an "unmarried" (in the sense of
de-married) 2 Juliet of forty-four, twice led to the altar and twice
divorced, and heroically sustains a charge of seduction against the
villain. He had promised to marry her-they always do-and now,
in five-reel style, enters a plea of "vampire" as a defense. Chivalrous
but unromantic, the law perhaps can not consider the knowledge and
experience of those whom it undertakes to protect.3 So that aside
from its failure as a scenario, the decision seems sound.4
'Trist v. Child (1874, U. S.) 2i Wall. 441'; Providence Tool Co. v. Norris
(1864, U. S.) 2 Wall. 45; Crocker v. United States (I915) 240 U. S. 74, 79,
36 Sup. Ct. 245.Wiley v. Fleck (192o, Iowa) 178 N. W. 410.
'State v. Eddy (i918) 4o S. D. 39o, 167 N. W. 392.
'State v. Wallace (1916) 79 Ore. 129, 154 Pac. 430a
"People v. Weinstock (1912, City Magistrate's Court, N. Y.) 14o N. Y. Supp.
453, where the subject is ably reviewed. Contra, Jennings v. Commonwealth
(i9O9) io9 Va. 821, 63 S. E. io8o.
